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Abstract
The recent developments in the field of sport analytics have given researchers the tools to exam-
ine an increasingly diverse set of topics within the world of sport in ways not previously possible
(Alamar, 2013; Fry and Ohlmann, 2012). This study analyzes the decision-making processes of high
level coaches under different contexts and then determines whether or not a specific subconscious
psychological bias, known as the representativeness heuristic, caused the individual to make the
choice they did.
Past empirical research has examined people’s decisions in different contexts and, from those con-
texts, made inferences about how those individuals made their decisions and what errors in their
decision-making processes could have led to their suboptimal choices (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Kobberling and Wakker, 2005; Tom et al, 2007; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
The representativeness heuristic explains that errors in people’s judgment occur because their mind
places too much emphasis on the current situation (new information) and not enough on the original
odds (prior information). Previous researchers have been unable to separate the new and prior com-
ponents of people’s decision-making when studying real-world scenarios in a sport context (Carter
and Machol, 1978; Carroll, Palmer, and Thorn, 1989; Carroll et al, 1989; Patel, 2012; Romer, 2006).
This research is different than the previous related research in that we utilize statistical models to
gauge how people weight different information when making high-pressure decisions in sport. We
hypothesize that coaches are disproportionately weighting new information against prior information
when making decisions, and thus, yielding to the representativeness heuristic.
To test our hypothesis, we construct numerous Bayesian updating models to represent the impact of
National Football League (NFL) coaches’ decision-making on the likelihood of winning games. Uti-
lizing a Bayesian approach enables us to keep the new and prior odds of winning the game separate,
and thus, keep the two components of the representativeness heuristic separate. Regression analysis
is then used with both of the components to directly test for the representativeness heuristic in NFL
coaches’ decision-making by estimating the effect each component has on the coaches’ decisions.
These estimates form the basis of our hypothesis tests.
Index terms— Bayesian, decision-making, representativeness, analytics, football
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1 Introduction
Do people consistently make suboptimal decisions? Past empirical research has examined people’s
decisions in different contexts and, from those contexts, made inferences about the errors in their
decision-making and what could have led to their suboptimal choices. The two primary decision-
making theories are Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory. Expected Utility Theory suggests
that individuals make decisions by maximizing utility in terms of probabilities (Bernoulli, 1738; En-
glish trans. 1954; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945, 2007). Prospect Theory argues that it is
too difficult and computationally intensive for people to always maximize utility as Expected Utility
Theory suggests, which can lead to bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1973, 1974).
Prospect Theory uses four well-established psychological biases (or heuristics) to explain why peo-
ple make the decisions they do. These heuristics are loss aversion, representativeness, anchoring,
and availability. The representativeness heuristic explains that errors in people’s judgment occur
because their mind over-generalizes previous similar events and places too much emphasis on the
current situation (new information) and not enough on the original odds (prior information), rather
than weighting both pieces of information appropriately. The heuristic causes relative insensitivity
to prior information, the drawing of strong inferences from small sample sizes, a misconception of
chance, the illusion of validity, and the underestimation in the likelihood of change in a trend. Previ-
ous researchers have been unable to separate the prior odds and conditional likelihood components of
people’s decision-making when studying real-world scenarios. This study uses a Bayesian approach
to evaluate coaches’ decisions, enabling us to keep the two components separate, which allows us to
directly test for the representativeness heuristic.
Bayes’ rule describes the normative decision-making process involving the optimal combination of
two components: prior and new information. Our approach will observe these two cognitive com-
ponents of decision-making processes on aggregated data. To examine their impact we will develop
theoretical models of the Bayesian updating process by exploiting various aspects of in-game infor-
mation related to the likelihood of event outcomes and real decisions made by coaches on fourth
down. Finally, we will test whether or not the representativeness heuristic is reflected in the aggre-
gated decision-making processes of coaches.
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There have been studies to examine how individuals process information, but they use a laboratory
setting to evaluate their subjects’ decisions. They found that people underweight the prior prob-
ability of an event occurring (Grether, 1980, 1992), do not efficiently incorporate new information
(Charness and Levin, 2005; Friedman, 1998), and that the influence of new information is the great-
est when it contradicts the prior information (Ashton and Ashton, 1998). Charness et al. (2007)
found that the subjects’ error rates decreased when in groups versus in isolation, and concluded
that systematic deviations from expected Bayesian updating “are due, in part, to artificial isolation
imposed by experimental design” (p.147). In this project, we blend optimal coaching decisions and
experimental approaches to examine how coaches’ decision-making processes are, in aggregate, re-
flected in their fourth down decisions.
In the National Football League (NFL) a head coach is required to make difficult decisions in a
variety of situations throughout the course of a game. One of these situations is when his team is
facing a fourth down on offense. This study evaluates the decisions of professional football coaches
in those fourth down situations. These are important situations because a team on offense gets four
attempts (downs) to gain at least a net total of 10 yards while the opposing team’s defense tries to
stop them. If they are successful then they are awarded a new set of four downs to gain another 10
yards, and this pattern continues until they score, time runs out, or they fail to gain the required 10
yards, in which case they relinquish possession of the ball to the opposing team, which then attempts
to move the ball in the opposite direction under the same process.
On fourth down a team can attempt to gain a first down, or kick the ball by either attempting a field
goal for three points or punting to the other team, both of which would result in the opposing team
gaining possession of the ball. It is much more common for a team to score when it is on offense, and
thus, a fourth down is an important situation for coaches to make an optimal decision because it
is the last opportunity his team has to maintain possession of the ball by gaining a new set of downs.
Choosing the sport of American football, and specifically within the context of the NFL, to evaluate
an individual’s decision-making processes for the representativeness heuristic was done because it
provides a circumstance in which the decision-maker (head coach) and their decisions are frequently
and regularly making an impact on the likelihood of the potential game outcomes. Additionally,
evaluating fourth down decisions specifically, introduces a circumstance in which we know that the
head coach is the one making the final decision on what to do, which also lends itself to the re-
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search of Charness et al. (2007) when they found that individuals’ error rates decrease when in
groups rather than isolation. While coaches are not literally isolated when they make decisions on
fourth down, they are figuratively in isolation as the lone person responsible for making the decision.
Similarly, the findings of Ashton and Ashton (1998) also make fourth downs in the NFL an intrigu-
ing circumstance for examining the impact of the representativeness heuristic on an individual’s
decision-making process. Their results showed that the influence of new information is the greatest
when it contradicts the prior information, and that this can lead to suboptimal decision-making
(Ashton and Ashton, 1998). Specifically, this can cause the decision-maker to be more susceptible
to biases, such as the hot-hand fallacy or gambler’s fallacy, which are both byproducts of the repre-
sentativeness heuristic (Sundali and Croson, 2006). As mentioned previously, this heuristic causes
relative insensitivity to prior information, the drawing of strong inferences from small sample sizes, a
misconception of chance, the illusion of validity, and the underestimation in the likelihood of change
in a trend—all of which can come into play when a coach is making a decision on fourth down.
Thus, the findings in this research provide support that previous criticisms of the claims that have
been made based on experimental research are potentially overstated.
This study determines whether or not coaches are yielding to the representativeness heuristic when
they are making these fourth down decisions. This examination is conducted by first uncovering
which of the options on fourth down is the optimal decision in different circumstances (game-states)
based on its impact on the odds of winning the game. Second, we measure the relative weight used
by coaches for the new and original information when they are making their decisions.
2 Literature Review
There is a large body of previous research which has examined decision-making in the NFL. A num-
ber of those researchers have examined what the optimal decision is on fourth down. All of the
researchers that examined fourth down decision-making (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol,
1971, 1978; Patel, 2012; Romer, 2002, 2006) have found that teams/coaches act too conservatively
by opting to kick more often than they should. Where this study uses a win probability model,
previous researchers used expected points models to evaluate the impact of fourth down decisions
on a game. An expected points model looks at different situations in the past to see which team
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was the next team to score and how many points they scored. The difference between each team’s
average is used as the amount of points a team can expect to score (or allow) in a similar situation.
There are several notable win probability models that are well-respected. For example, Brian Burke
made an in-game win probability model using regression analysis with Markov model interpolations.
Frank Frigo and Charles Bower also made an in-game win probability model using a program they
created in 2005 called ‘ZEUS Football’ which utilized the techniques of Monte Carlo simulation. The
website FiveThirtyEight made a pre-game win probability model by implementing the approach used
for the Elo rating system, which was originally developed to provide rankings for chess players (Elo,
1978). Similarly, the website Pro-Football-Reference introduced their own in-game win probability
model in 2013, building upon work previously done by Stern (1991) and Winston (2012). However,
none of these win probability models were developed within the realm of academia, which detracts
from their validity, despite how well-respected they are outside of the peer-reviewed field.
Carter and Machol (1971) created the first expected points model for the NFL, using data from
the games of the first half of the 1969 season. They based their research on finding the expected
points for a team with a first down at different field positions. Carter and Machol (1978) used data
from the 1971 season to build off of their previous research (1971) by finding out how the expected
points value would be impacted by the decision to punt, attempt a field goal, or go for it on fourth
down while on the opponent’s side of the field. They found that, in those situations, coaches were
choosing to kick field goals with a much higher frequency than they were deciding to go for it, even
in situations where the expected points value would be greater by going for it. They believed that
coaches were failing to take into account “the negative value imposed on the opposition team when
they are given possession of the ball in the shadow of their own goal post.”
Carroll, Palmer, and Thorn (1988) used data from the 1986 NFL season to construct an expected
points model with both a similar method and similar findings to those of Carter and Machol. They
found that when a team is facing a fourth down with six yards to gain, or less, it was hardly ever
the best choice to attempt a field goal despite the fact that teams were kicking the ball the majority
of the time. There are some key limitation to the research done by Carter and Machol (1971 and
1978) and Carroll, Palmer, and Thorn (1988) in that they assumed linearity across the different field
positions and they did not evaluate their results for statistical significance. They also admitted that
they believed the data sets they were working with were too small. Most importantly, they did not
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account for time remaining or score margin.
In a well-cited paper, Romer (2006) examined first quarter NFL play-by-play data from 1998-2000,
resulting in 11,112 observations. He used an instrumental variable approach to estimate the expected
points value of having a first down with 10 yards to go at each yard line. Romer used these results
to estimate how many yards to go would have an equal value for kicking and attempting a first down
across each yard line. He then decided what the optimal fourth down decision would be based on if
the number of yards to go was more or less than the corresponding critical point for the yard line
they were on. Romer then compared his optimal fourth down decisions to coaches’ actual decisions
and found that of the 1,068 fourth downs in which his analysis indicated that teams should attempt a
first down, they instead kicked 959 times (89.794 percent), prompting him to state, “examination of
actual decisions shows systematic, clear-cut, and overwhelmingly statistically significant departures
from the decisions that would maximize teams’ chances of winning.”
While Romer’s method allowed for a non-linear expected points model and his results showed statis-
tical significance, there were still some limitations to his study. The research included a larger data
set, but he largely negated this improvement by only using data from the first quarter of each game.
He does this to get around having to account for the score margin and time remaining, “to avoid
the complications introduced when one team is well ahead or when the end of a half is approaching,
I focus on the first quarter.”
Patel (2012) made an expected points model using data from the 2007-2011 seasons to evaluate
coaches’ fourth down decisions. To avoid accounting for score margin and time remaining, Patel cut
down his data as well, developing his expected points model using only plays that occurred in the
first or third quarter and with a score margin of 10 points or less. Patel also used Brian Burke’s win
probability calculator (http://wp.advancednflstats.com/winprobcalc1.php) to examine the coaches’
decisions on every fourth down play from 2007-2011 that took place in the second or fourth quarter
and were within 30 yards of the opponent’s end zone. Patel found that “the behavior of coaches
in the National Football League on fourth downs does not align with the behavior that optimizes a
teams probability of success. This fact remains true even though fourth-down decisions are relatively
simple.” Patel went on to mention that prospect theory and loss aversion could be part of what is
causing coaches to make these suboptimal decisions, “coaches might value losses of a play higher
than they would the corresponding gains of a play and so they might be calling conservative plays.”
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Common findings among these papers suggest that other unknown factors, beyond those that di-
rectly impact the situation, were influencing the coaches’ decision-making. However, none were
able to definitively discern the underlying source of the bias or biases. Romer (2006) states “there
is little evidence about whether conservative behaviors arise because individuals have nonstandard
objective functions or because they are imperfect maximizers.” Romer went on to mention it could
be that those involved in the decision-making process are being profit-maximizing rather than win-
maximizing, or that the decision makers are systematically imperfect maximizers. It could also be
that they perceive the cost of losing as the result of a failed gamble as greater than the cost of losing
from playing it safe, which could be influenced by any number of factors including job security, fan
support, the media’s reaction, players’ trust, or internal/personal feelings, such as experiencing more
regret (Romer, 2006).
The researchers had to make inferences from the contexts they analyzed to determine what could
be causing the coaches to make suboptimal decisions. However, due to their methodologies, none of
them were able to provide conclusive evidence to verify or validate their conclusions. This is because,
despite their varying methods being appropriate to determine whether or not coaches are making
suboptimal decisions, they were not conducive to examining the information processing procedure
of the coaches. This means that while their methodologies did allow them to determine if coaches
were making suboptimal decision, it prevented from finding out why they were making suboptimal
decisions.
Furthermore, none of the previous researchers accounted for team quality in their analyses, but in-
stead worked under the assumption that the two competing teams were evenly matched or average.
This study employs Bayes’ rule, which provides us with the flexibility to account for team quality
and keep the prior odds separate from the conditional likelihood to assess whether or not the repre-
sentativeness heuristic is a factor that is causing coaches to make suboptimal decisions.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Theoretical Approach
Bayesian updating models and a latent variable approach are used to test for the representativeness
bias. Specifically, a Bayes’ rule formulation is used to represent the in-game likelihood of winning
based on pre-game probabilities and in-game information (game-state). Then regression analysis
estimates the weights of the information using the prior probability and conditional likelihood com-
ponents to test for representativeness in NFL coaches’ decision-making. Bayes’ rule illustrates the
operation of combining those two components to arrive at the optimal conclusion as Expected Utility
Theory would recommend. We will use Bayes’ rule to examine the decisions that NFL coaches are
making on fourth down and to determine whether or not they are guilty of the representativeness
heuristic.
We assume NFL coaches have the following options for their 4th down decisions: 1) first-down at-
tempt (FDA), 2) field goal attempt (FGA), or 3) punt (PNT). If a team achieves a first down they
retain possession of the ball and are awarded a new set of downs. If they attempt a first down
and fail, they relinquish possession of the ball to the opposing team on the yard-line at which they
were stopped. Teams that successfully kick a field goal are awarded three points and then kickoff
to the other team. Missed field goal attempts result in the opposing team taking possession of the
ball with their starting field position being the point from which the ball was kicked. A punt gives
the opposing team possession of the ball on the yard line at which the punt goes out of bounds, is
downed, or where the return man is stopped. If the punt goes into the end zone, the opposing team
takes possession of the ball at their own 20-yard line. It is unlikely a team retains possession of the
ball when they choose to punt or attempt a field goal. They only retain possession if the opposing
team commits a penalty that awards them the necessary yardage for a first down, or if the opponent
fumbles (or touches) the ball, which is then recovered by the kicking team.
The likelihood, or odds (o), that the gth game is eventually won by team c given each potential
decision, d, and the current game-state (sg,t) at time t can be expressed as
o∗(cg,t|dg,t, sg,t) = oˆ(cg,t|sg,t)× oˆ(dg,t|cg, sg,t) (1)
Equation (1) is Bayes’ rule represented in odds form. The left-hand side term of Equation (1) de-
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notes the posterior odds of a game win given the decision and game-state. Note, it is straightforward
to represent odds as the ratio of probabilities:
p∗(cg,t|dg,t,sg,t)
p∗(c¯g,t|dg,t,sg,t) . The first right-hand side term is the
in-game odds of a win prior to the decision, and the second term is the likelihood ratio, or inverse
conditional decision odds.
Equation (1) can be transformed into log-odds and expressed as:
o∗(cg|dg,t, sg,t) = β0 + β1ln(oˆ(cg,t|sg,t)) + β2ln(oˆ(dg,t|cg, sg,t)) + εg,t (2)
where o(cg|dg,t) = 1 if o∗(cg,t|dg,t) ≥ 1.0 and 0 otherwise (3)
Finally, the in-game win odds, oˆ(cg) is also made to be estimated throughout the progression of
games with Bayes’ rule.
oˆ(cg,t|sg,t) = o(cg,t=0)× o(sg,t|cg) (4)
Equation (4) represents the in-game odds (o) team c has of winning game g given the game-state (s)
at time t. The first right-hand side component, o(cg,t=0), is the pre-game (prior) odds (o) of team
c winning the game (t = 0). The second right-hand side component, o(sg,t|cg), is the conditional
likelihood (o) of the game-state (s) occurring at time t given that team c wins the game.
Equations (2) and (3) forms the basis of the representativeness hypothesis testing procedure, show-
ing that suboptimal decision-making exists. Equation (4) provides the necessary in-game odds (new
information), while Equation (5) provides the separate conditional likelihood information for the
decision based on historical data (original information), which are the two necessary components to
conduct a test for representativeness.
3.2 Empirical Approach
Prior to estimating the unknown parameters of Equation (1) it is necessary, for empirical pur-
poses, to estimate the in-game win odds prior to the decision, oˆ(cg,t|sg,t), and the likelihood ratio,
oˆ(dg,t|cg, sg,t). To do so, we use a multinomial logistic regression to estimate the odds of each de-
cision being chosen by the coach. This results in three different conditional likelihoods and thus, a
different posterior for each of the three choices, which allows us to evaluate the decision itself rather
than the outcome from the decision. This is important because it is possible for a coach to make a
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good decision that has a bad result and vice versa. The posterior odds can then be compared to the
in-game pre-decision win odds for each option and the decision that has the most favorable impact
on the team’s win odds is the optimal decision.
Note, all NFL games designate one team as the home team and the other team as the away team,
even for games that are not played at one of their home stadiums. We use c as the team designation
for the decision-makers (the offense) and c¯ as their opponent (the defense). Similarly, we use h as
the home team and a as the away team. This is important because we represent all game outcomes
in the data relative to the home team (h) for Equations (4), (6), and (7) while we represent all game
outcomes in the data relative to the team on offense (c) for Equations (1), (2), (3), (5), and (8). (ie.
If cg = hg, then c¯g = h¯g = ag where hg and ag are the home and away team respectively.)
3.2.1 Likelihood Ratio Estimation Procedure
We use the following regression equation to estimate the odds of each decision (d) being made, given
the game-state components (θ) and game outcome (cg).
oˆ(dg,t|cg, sg,t) = FML(X ′g,tθ + εg,t)|cg (5)
On the left-hand side, the d term is a categorical variable representing each of the three poten-
tial decisions. Those three options are represented as dFDA = a first down attempt, dFGA =
a field goal attempt, and dPNT = a punt. On the right-hand side X
′
represents the matrix of vari-
ables that the game-state is comprised of: the score margin, time remaining, timeouts remaining,
field position, and yards to go for a first down, as well as a time-adjusted value of the bookmakers’
over/under (total points scored by the two teams combined) for the game. It should be noted that
while the current down is one of the variables that is part of the game-state, it is not included in
this matrix because the subset of data used for Equation (5) contains only fourth down plays.
3.2.2 In-game Win Odds Estimation Procedure
The in-game odds of a win prior to the decision is estimated through the win odds model represented
by Equation (4). To estimate those odds, we first need to estimate the pre-game odds of winning
and the odds of the game-state given the outcome of the game, to be used as the prior and likelihood
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ratio components, respectively.
The closing bookmaker point spreads are transformed into game outcome win odds with a logistic
regression and used as a proxy variable for the pre-game odds of winning, which are represented as
o(hg,t=0) = F
L(ψ0 + ψ1X
1
g,t=0 + εg,t) (6)
where o(hg,t=0) is the odds (o) of the home team (h) winning the game (g) before it begins (t = 0),
while X1g,t=0 represents the game’s closing point spread with respect to the home team. Figure 1
illustrates the reliability of using point spreads as a proxy variable for the pre-game odds of winning.
The likelihood ratio of the game-state (s) at time t is estimated with a multinomial logistic regression
and is represented as
o(sg,t|hˆg) = FML(X ′g,tλ+ εg,t)|hg (7)
where X
′
again represents a matrix of variables: time remaining, timeouts remaining, field position,
down, yards to go, possession, and the time-adjusted closing bookmaker over/under data for the
total points scored.
This model, coupled with Equation (6), captures the relevant information that a coach should be
taking into consideration when making a decision on fourth down. All of the variables that the
game-state is comprised of are accounted for, and by also including the closing bookmaker data
we are able to account for not only team quality, but other additional factors such as weather and
stadium effects as well.
3.2.3 Hypothesis Testing Estimation Procedure
A logistic regression equation is used as the test for representativeness, which is expressed as
o∗(cg|sg,t, dg,t) = FL(ϕ0 + ϕ1 ln oˆ(cg,t|sg,t) + ϕ2 ln oˆ(dg,t|cg, sg,t) + εg,t) (8)
where the null hypothesis (H0) is that the parameter estimates (ϕ1 and ϕ2) for the prior odds
component and likelihood ratio component are equal to each other, suggesting that the coaches are
equally weighting original information and new information in their decision-making process.
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For the purposes of this study, new information is being defined as the team’s current in-game win
odds, while original information is being defined as the odds of a coach making the decision that he
did given that his team ended up winning the game, which is generated from historical data.
4 Data
This analysis uses play-by-play data from each regular season game over a 12 year span (2003 -
2014). The six odd-numbered years are used to estimate the in-game win odds, while the six even-
numbered years are used to test the decision-making hypotheses. The data set goes back to 2003
because that allows for a sufficiently large dataset without going back to 2002, which was the most
recent expansion year for the league. Going through the 2014 season without including the 2015
season was to account for the fact that there was a rule change for the 2015 season that moved back
extra point attempts, which impacts how likely a team is to successfully convert a point-after-try
(PAT) following a scored touchdown.
For each play/observation there is information containing the decision and associated game-state in
which the play took place. This includes the closing bookmaker information, identifiers for the home
team and away team, the score of the game, time remaining, field position, down, yards to go, play
type, timeouts remaining, and the outcome of the play, as well as an indicator variable for whether
or not the team won the game.
To estimate the in-game win odds, the data is organized into panel data by the season, game and
play. This results in 468,699 game-play observations with all game outcomes relative to the home
team. For the decision-making model the data is filtered to only include fourth down plays with all
game outcomes relative to the possession team, resulting in 45,559 (9.7 percent) game-play observa-
tions. First, second, and third down were 36.1, 27.2, and 17.3 percent respectively. The remaining
observations were kickoffs (6.4 percent) and extra points (3.2 percent).
The summary statistics for the conditional likelihood component of the optimal decision model are
provided in Table 1 across each decision option (first down attempt, field goal attempt, and punt)
for the variables that make up the game-state. This includes yards to go, absolute yard line, minutes
remaining, score margin, in-game win probability and pre-game win probability with respect to the
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offensive team, as well as the bookmaker data on point totals, the number of timeouts remaining
for each team, and an indicator variable for the home team.
In terms of the fourth down plays, 64.02 percent (29,186) were punts, 23.21 percent (10,583) were
field goals, and 12.70 percent (5,790) were first down attempts. The average yards to go was 7.66
with a standard deviation of 5.66. Of the 5,790 first down attempts, 3,940 (68.05 percent) occurred
when the offensive team was trailing (21.61 percent when leading) and 56.29 percent were in the
fourth quarter (third quarter: 14.91 percent, second quarter: 17.13 percent, first quarter: 11.68
percent). This indicates that teams are typically attempting to gain a first down when they are
already in a losing situation. This is occurring despite the fact that 46.7 percent of the first down
attempts were successful. That is a much higher success rate than the combined average for the
first three downs (27.47 percent) or any of the other three downs individually, the highest of which
was on third down at 38.90 percent (first: 19.53 percent, second: 30.75 percent). Similarly, teams
that were “underdogs” (meaning that bookmakers predicted them to lose the game) attempted first
downs 13.8 percent of the time while teams that were favored to win were at 11.5 percent.
Losing teams attempted a first down 16.22 percent of the time while winning teams attempted a first
down 8.80 percent. Teams with an in-game win probability of less than 0.50 attempt a first down
17.21 percent of the time while teams above 0.50 are at 7.88 percent. This is further indication
that teams are deciding to attempt a first down with a higher frequency when they are already
likely to lose. The success rate for the losing teams was 41.80 percent while the winning teams’ was
59.19 percent. This indicates that despite the fact that winning teams successfully convert their
first down attempts with nearly 150 percent the frequency of the losing teams, they attempt first
downs approximately half as often. This indicates that rather than choosing to attempt a first down
based on when it is the optimal decision, coaches are instead choosing this option out of desperation.
The components of the win probability model can be seen in Tables 2, 3 and 4, which collectively
present the summary statistics for the prior and conditional likelihood. Table 2 presents the mean,
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values for the prior probability (with respect to the
home team) for games in which the home team won, lost and tied. The summary statistics for the
variables in the conditional likelihood are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for the offense and defense
respectively. The data is shown across wins, losses and ties, and includes time remaining, down,
yards to go, absolute yard line, and score margin, all with respect to the home team. The number
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of timeouts remaining for each team and the predicted point total are provided as well. Tables 3
and 4 are separated by offense and defense to account for a possession indicator variable that is also
included in the model.
5 Results
5.1 Theoretical Models
5.1.1 Decision Model
The results from Equation (1) are reflected in Figure 2, which illustrates the change in an offensive
team’s win probability based on the decision they make on fourth down with respect to how many
yards they need to gain a first down. Figure 2 was generated using the fourth down plays with 10
or fewer yards to go that occurred when the score margin was less than or equal to eight, and took
place on or between the defensive team’s 33- and 40-yard lines.
These criteria were chosen because they represent a situation in which all three fourth down options
are viable choices while the score is still close. When the two teams’ scores are within eight points
of each other, it is also referred to as the teams being within one possession of each other, due to
the fact that eight is the maximum number of points a team is able to score on a single possession.
Being within this section of the field would require a long field goal attempt, while punting would
be unlikely to net the team very many yards, and attempting to gain a new set of downs and failing
would leave the opposing team with favorable starting field position.
This type of situation is known as being in no man’s land, which is a vague term that refers to a
section of the field, where the exact yard lines are unspecified. For the purposes of this study it was
decided that identifying a range where the three different options are similar both, in terms of how
many times they have been chosen, and in terms of their expected likelihood of success, would be
best for analyzing the optimal decisions across yards to go. To be considered successful field goal
attempts had to be made, first down attempts had to result in a new set of downs for the offense,
and punts had to result in the opponent starting their possession inside of their own 11-yard line.
From the 36- and 37-yard lines (the middle of the area specified above), punts were successful 190
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out of 355 times (53.52 percent), field goals were successful 111 out of 202 times (54.95 percent),
and first down attempts were successful 145 out of 272 times (53.31 percent). Three yards were
added on to each side of the range to give us the area from the 33-yard line to the 40-yard line.
Within this range all field goal attempts would be of 50 or more yards, and all punts that resulted
in a touchback would net the team just 20 or fewer yards, and the expanded range resulted in only
slight changes of the success rates. Punts were successful 53.04 percent of the time and field goal
attempts were successful 58.30 percent of the time, while first down attempts with 10 or fewer yards
to go were successful 51.16 percent of the time.
As can be seen in Figure 2, with about seven yards to go is where the critical point is for deciding
between the choice to attempt to gain a first down and the choice to kick a field goal. This is
consistent with the findings of Romer (2006) when his results showed that “after mideld, the gain
from kicking falls, and so the critical value rises. It is 6.5 yards at the opponents 45 and peaks at
9.8 on the opponents 33.” It is also noteworthy that on average punting in this situation is never
the optimal decision and is only the second-best option once there are 10 yards to go. Despite this,
punting is the most frequently chosen decision. Of the 3,535 times teams were facing a fourth down
on this section of the field, coaches chose to punt 1,548 times (43.79 percent), which is 706 more
times than they chose to kick a field goal (842 or 23.81 percent) and 403 more times than they chose
to attempt a first down (1,145 or 32.39 percent).
Additionally, choosing to punt under these conditions decreases a team’s win probability across all
yards to go. Deciding to punt with one yard to go would result in a change to the possession team’s
win probability of approximately -0.06, while punting with 10 yards to go results in a -0.02. At-
tempting a field goal starts at about -0.01 with one yard to go and then hovers around a 0.00 change
in win probability from two to seven yards to go, at which point it starts to rise to its maximum
increase in win probability of 0.02. Lastly, attempting a first down starts at its maximum with an in-
crease in win probability of approximately 0.08 when there is one yard to go, then decreases until its
critical point with field goal attempts and the x-axis (a 0.00 change to the win probability) at about
seven yards to go before reaching it’s minimum of approximately -0.03 when there are 10 yards to go.
With seven yards to go being the point at which it becomes no longer the optimal decision to at-
tempt a first down, and instead is where it becomes equally beneficial to kick a field goal, it would
be expected for coaches to choose a first down attempt with a higher frequency when they are less
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than seven yards away from gaining a first down. However, it is only with one or two yards to go
that a first down attempt was the most common choice; at three yards to go coaches selected to
punt 43.75 percent of the time, while only choosing to kick a field goal or attempt a first down 22.73
and 33.52 percent of the time respectively. For each of the other number of yards to go, coaches
chose to punt more than 51.41 percent of the time, while neither of the other two options were ever
selected with a frequency of more than 33.80 percent.
These trends hold true when evaluating the optimal decision across absolute yard line. Where Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the optimal decision across yards to go, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate when it is the
optimal decision to attempt to gain a first down rather than to punt or kick a field goal across
absolute yard line. Figure 3 uses plays within the 40-yard line to compare first down attempts and
field goals, while Figure 4 examines plays from the defensive team’s 40-yard line and beyond to
compare first down attempts and punts.
Figure 3 was created using the data from fourth down plays where the offense had 10 or fewer yards
to go for a first down, in the same way that Figure 2 was generated. Unlike, Figure 2 however,
Figure 3 includes data from all plays in which the score margin was within two possessions (between
-16 and 16) rather than one possession. This was done to ensure that there would be plenty of
situations where making a field goal would be of high importance for the offense. For example, if
a team is trailing by 10 points then they would need both a touchdown and a field goal to tie the
game. Similarly, if a team is leading by 14 points and they make a field goal, they would not only
be increasing their lead by three points, but they would then also be leading by three possessions,
as there would be no way for the opposing team to score 17 points in just two possessions.
The results show that, on average, it is better to attempt to gain a first down rather than attempt a
field goal inside of the opponent’s 40-yard line, with the change in win probability being higher for
first down attempts across all of the yard lines. The two estimates are closest around the 10-yard
line because as a team gets closer and closer to the goal line (the 0-yard line) it becomes easier and
easier for the kickers to make field goals while it becomes harder and harder for a team to gain yards
(and score a touchdown) due to their play-calling options becoming more limited and the opposing
team having less area to worry about defending. This is reflected in Figure 3 with the two lines
drawing close to each other at about the 30-yard line and staying close until just after they nearly
meet at about the 10-yard line.
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Outside of this 20-yard area from the 30-yard line to the 10-yard line is where we see the biggest
differences between a first down attempt and a field goal attempt. Going from the 30-yard line to the
40-yard line it is logical for the field goal attempts to decrease as that is when it starts to approach
the limits of most field goal kickers’ range, and therefore it becomes more beneficial to attempt a
first down, which is reflected in Figure 2 as well. Inside of the 10-yard line is when it starts becoming
more likely that the offensive team would be able to score a touchdown on (or subsequently to) a
first down attempt because the defense would likely be unable to prevent the offense from scoring
for four more plays. The result of this can be seen in Figure 3 around the five-yard line, where
the increase in the separation between the two lines starts to become more obvious. These findings
are again similar to those of Romer (2006), who wrote that his “analysis implies that once a team
reaches its opponents 5, it is always better off on average going for it.”
Teams with a score margin from -16 to 16 faced a fourth down on or inside of the opponent’s five-
yard line 1,723 times. In this situation they opted to kick a field goal 1,253 times (72.72 percent)
while only attempting to gain a first down 470 times (27.28 percent). Teams on or inside of the
10-yard line (n = 3,279) were even more lopsided in their decisions, choosing to kick field goals 79.93
percent (2,621) of the time. Between the 10- and the 30-yard lines teams attempted field goals 4,123
times out of 4,870 occurrences (84.66 percent) while attempting to gain a first down 746 times (15.32
percent) with the one remaining play being a punt. Of the 3,129 fourth downs teams faced from the
30-yard line to the 40-yard line, as they reached the fringe of field goal range, they actually chose
to attempt a first down (1,026) nearly as many times as they chose to attempt a field goal (1,129).
However they also chose to punt (974) nearly that many times as well, which, as was discussed above
with respect to Figure 2, is not the optimal decision in these situations.
Figure 4 was created by further separating the field into two more sections. For the half of the graph
that spans from the 40-yard line to the 70-yard line, it still uses the data from fourth down plays
with 10 or fewer yards to go, but in situations where the score margin was between -11 and 11, while
the portion of the graph between the offensive team’s 30-yard line and their own goal line (from the
70 to the 100 in terms of absolute yard lines) uses data from games within two possession, as before
with Figure 3. Using score margins between -11 and 11 allowed for a higher ratio of situations in
which a team in the middle of the field would be simply trying to get into field goal range. This is
due to the fact that teams trailing by 9, 10, or 11 points could tie the game or take the lead with a
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touchdown and a field goal, while teams trailing by more than that would need two touchdowns.
The dashed line representing the change in win probability as a result of deciding to punt stays close
to zero across all of the yard lines. This is reflecting an underlying effect from teams choosing to
punt from their own half of the field (absolute yard lines larger than 50) the large majority of the
time, regardless of how many yards they are from a first down, and whether or not they are leading
or trailing in the game. They tend to only choose a first down attempt when they are in a desperate
situation late in the game, which is also reflected in Table 1 and was discussed previously in the Data
section. This impacts the output from the conditional likelihood components of Equations (1) and
(4), which means the in-game win probabilities on this side of the field are already accounting for
the fact that there is a high likelihood that the team is going to punt. This improves the accuracy
of the estimated win probabilities and thus, when the team actually decides to punt, the resulting
change in their win probability is minimal.
Additionally, starting around the 45-yard line there is a decrease in the change in win probability
for choosing to punt. This is because the likelihood of making a field goal is increasing and the
cost of a failed first down attempt is decreasing, while the maximum potential benefit of a punt is
decreasing as well. It could also be due, in part, to the team being closer to no man’s land, where
it is no longer overwhelmingly likely that the team will opt to punt, and therefore, there is more of
an impact to the change in win probability as the result of a team deciding to punt.
The solid line on Figure 4 reflects the change in win probability for if a team were to choose to
attempt a first down rather than punt. For absolute yard lines higher than 80 (the possession’s team
20-yard line) there is a negative impact on the win probability. This is logical, as a failed first down
attempt in this section of the field would give the opposing team possession of the ball in a situation
where they would already be very likely to score. Romer (2002) found that, “even on its 10-yard
line - 90 yards from a score - a team within 3 yards of a first down is better off on average going
for it” and he went on to say “although these findings contradict the conventional wisdom, they are
quite intuitive.” It makes sense for Romer to mention the 10-yard line in this context (rather than
the 20-yard line), because he is referring to teams with three yards to go (or less) for a first down,
while the majority of the plays used for generating Figure 4 had more than three yards to go to gain
a new set of downs, with an average of 8.43 and median of seven.
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For the next few yard lines on the graph (between the 77- and 80-yard lines) choosing to attempt
a first down continues to be approximately equally as beneficial as deciding to punt. However, at
about the team’s own 24-yard line (absolute yard line of 76) it starts to have a larger positive im-
pact on the team’s win probability when deciding to attempt a first down instead of punting. In
the graph Romer (2002) is referring to in the above quote, it appears that around the 25-yard line,
a team with five or fewer yards to go for a first down should, on average, attempt to gain a first
down rather than punt. My findings once again align with his as it is around the 25-yard line where
Figure 4 indicates that it becomes more beneficial to attempt a first down, and in the data used to
generate Figure 4 the median yards to go for fourth downs at that point on the field is five yards to go.
As alluded to before, the ratio of times teams have chosen to punt compared to the number of times
they have chosen to attempt a first down is extremely disproportionate on the section of the field
covered in Figure 4. Fourth downs have occurred 21,345 times at absolute yard lines greater than 50
while the score margin was within two possessions. In these situations teams have decided to punt
on 20,276 (94.99 percent) of those occasions while the other 1,069 (5.01 percent) were first down
attempts. From the 40-yard line to the 50-yard line the decisions are less lopsided but still heavily
unbalanced with 4,176 (85.28 percent) punts, 692 (14.13 percent) first down attempts, and 29 (0.59
percent) field goal attempts.
5.1.2 Win Odds Model
The results of the win odds model shown in Equation (4) are illustrated in Figure 5, which provides
the results across time remaining in the game. Specifically, Figure 5 shows the results in the form of
probabilities (rather than odds) with respect to the team on offense across five different score-states.
Figure 5 was generated using the data from teams that had possession of the ball with a first down
on their own 20-yard line (80 yards from scoring), and 10 yards to go for a new set of downs.
These specifications were chosen because out of all the possible combinations of down, distance, and
field position, this particular combination represents the most common situation in football with
11,423 occurrences in this data set, which is nearly four times more common than the situation (first
and 10 at the 69-yard line) with the second-most occurrences (3,079). This is due to the fact that
the rules in the NFL during this time period caused touchbacks (when a kickoff or punt lands in
or beyond the end zone) to result in a team taking possession of the ball at their own 20-yard line
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(for the 2016 season, the NFL is doing a one-year trial where this will be moved to the 25-yard line)
and every possession starts with a first down and 10 yards to go, barring those that begin within 10
yards of the opposing team’s end zone. This is also why the second-most common situation takes
place exactly 11 yards further down the field.
This situation is used to examine the in-game win probabilities of the following five score-states:
1. leading by two or more possessions (score margin of 9 or more)
2. leading by one possession (score margin from 1 to 8)
3. tied (score margin equal to 0)
4. trailing by one possession (score margin from -8 to -1)
5. and trailing by two or more possessions (score margin of -9 or less)
The resulting graph (Figure 5) is extremely logical. One would expect that, holding all else equal,
leading by two possessions is always better than leading by one possession, which is always better
than being tied, and so on. Figure 5 reflects that thought process with the highest win probability
always being for teams leading by two possessions and the lowest always being for teams trailing by
two possessions, with the other three score-states fitting in as expected without any of the five lines
ever intersecting with one of the others.
Figure 5 is also logical with respect to time remaining. When there is less time remaining in the
game, there is less time for the trailing team to come back, and less time that the leading team
would need to protect that lead. Thus, it would be expected that as time goes on in the game the
likelihood of winning would increase for teams with the lead, and decrease for teams that are trailing.
Similarly, if the game is tied, it is reasonable to expect the team on offense to be slightly more likely
to win the game based on the fact that the team with possession of the ball has a better chance
to score than the team on defense. Again, these rationales are reflected in Figure 5 as the in-game
win probabilities increase over time for teams with the lead, while they decrease for teams that are
trailing. And with the data being in respect to the team on offense, the line for teams that are tied
starts at slightly above a 0.50 in-game win probability, and very gradually increases to just under
0.55 before taking a slight decline at the very end, which reflects the fact that the team would not
have enough time to score and would therefore result in the game going to overtime, which causes
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the graph to regress back toward the 0.50 win probability.
The reliability of the in-game win odds model, Equation (4), was tested by using its posterior to
predict actual game outcomes with a regression model. This regression was run using a validation
set comprised of even-numbered years (2004, 2006, 2008, etc.) while the in-game win odds model
itself was developed using the odd-numbered years.
cg = F
L(ξ0 + ξ1 ln oˆ(cg,t|sg,t) + εg,t) (9)
Equation (9) returned a parameter estimate of 0.9925 for ξ1 with a standard error of 0.05 and a
p-value of less than 0.001, indicating statistical significance. A positive parameter estimate for ξ1
demonstrates that there is a positive correlation between the estimated in-game win odds and the
actual outcome of games. A parameter estimate of 0.9925 allows us to say that with a 10 percent in-
crease in the estimated in-game win odds, the probability of a win increases by 0.099 (or 9.9 percent).
5.2 Empirical Models
5.2.1 Pre-Game Win Probability Model
The first component of the in-game win odds model is the pre-game win probabilities, which serve
as the prior component of Equation (4). The pre-game win probabilities are estimated with Equa-
tion (6), the results of which are illustrated in Figure 1. An important note here is that a negative
value for a point spread means that team is projected to win the game while a positive value means
they are projected to lose, and that adding a team’s point spread to their predicted final score will
equal their opponent’s predicted final score. For example, if a team is projected to win with a final
score of 35 to 20, then their point spread would be -15, because their projected score (35) needs to
add to their point spread to equal their opponent’s projected score (20). Within that same exam-
ple, their opponent’s point spread would be +15, and would be calculated by following the same logic.
To convert these point spreads into win probabilities, we utilize a logistic regression (Equation (6))
to predict wins from point spreads with respect to the home team. The resulting parameter estimate
was -0.1463, with a standard error of .007 and a p-value less than 0.001, which indicates statistical
significance. It makes sense for the point spread’s parameter estimate to be a negative value because,
as explained above, the further negative a point spread is, the more the team is projected to win
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by. To demonstrate what Figure 1 is telling us, consider the example from before; if we assume
that the team with a point spread of -15 is the home team we see on Figure 1 that this equates to
approximately a 0.9 pre-game win probability, while if a home team had a point spread of -3 or +6,
their pre-game win probability would be about 0.6 and 0.3, respectively.
5.2.2 Conditional Likelihood of Decision Model
The results of the decision model’s conditional likelihood component (Equation (5)) are shown in
Table 5 with respect to the multinomial logistic regression’s omitted option, which is first down
attempts. The results are shown for both wins and losses. All but three of the estimates are statis-
tically significant at the .05 level, with all but six showing significance at the 0.005 level.
The parameter estimates for absolute yard line and yards to go are consistent with information that
was discussed previously in the interpretations of Figures 2, 3, and 4. The parameter estimates for
absolute yard line are negative for field goals and positive for punts across both wins and losses.
This means that as the absolute yard line decreases the likelihood of a field goal increases with
respect to first down attempts, and as the absolute yard line increases the likelihood of a punt also
increases. Yards to go has positive estimates for field goals and punts across both wins and losses.
This also makes sense; as a positive relationship would indicate that as the yards to go increases,
the likelihood that a team will choose to punt or kick a field goal also increases with respect to the
likelihood that they will attempt a first down.
Minutes remaining and score margin are where we see the most obvious differences between the
parameter estimates across wins and losses. The estimates for minutes remaining in losses are ap-
proximately two times the value of their estimates in wins, and the parameter estimates for score
margin are 10 times the value for losses compared to wins. These are again logical results as they
indicate that losing teams are less likely to punt or kick a field goal as their score margin and the
time remaining in the game decrease. This makes sense because when teams are trailing by a large
amount and/or time is running out, they have more of a necessity to score points quickly and thus,
have less incentive to punt or kick a field goal.
It is also worth noting that the absolute yard line parameter estimates are very similar across wins
and losses for both field goals (wins: -2.0734, losses: -2.0620) and punts (wins: 3.4359, losses:
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3.4623), and four of the smallest estimates are the minutes remaining and score margin for punts
and field goals within the winning teams’ decisions. That information coupled with the information
in the previous paragraph further indicates that teams are primarily choosing to attempt a first
down out of desperation, rather than appropriately weighting all of the relevant information in their
decision-making process.
5.3 Hypothesis Test
The hypothesis test presented in Equation (8) returned statistically significant results indicating to
reject the null hypothesis. The parameter estimates for the original and new information were 0.1334
and 0.9693 respectively. The original information had a standard error of 0.025 and a t-statistics of
5.276 while the new information had a standard error of 0.15 and a t-statistic of 63.958 and both
estimates have p-values less than 0.001, which indicates that these results are statistically significant.
The parameter estimate for the constant was -0.1033 with a standard error of 0.017, and also had a
p-value less than 0.001, which means that all three estimates for the hypothesis test are considered
to be statistically significant.
These parameter estimates show that coaches are putting approximately seven times more weight
on new information relative to original information, which signifies the presence of the representa-
tiveness heuristic in their decision-making processes on fourth down.
The same test for representativeness was conducted individually for each of the following subsets of
data:
• the years contained in the validation set (even-numbered years)
• home and away teams separately
• each of the four quarters
• all 32 teams in the National Football League
Testing for representativeness within each season was done to determine whether or not the coaches
were getting any better or worse at appropriately weighting the information from year to year. The
results for each year can be seen in Table 6. Every year had a higher parameter estimate for the
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new information compared to the original information, which indicates the presence of representa-
tiveness in the coaches’ decision-making processes for each year. In 2004 the difference between the
new and original information parameter estimates was 0.8653, while in 2014 it was 0.8367, which
indicates that the coaches, as a whole, have not improved their weighting of the two components in
their decision-making processes on fourth down over the given timespan. The p-values for the new
information were less than 0.001 for each year, indicating statistical significance, and all but one of
the parameter estimates for the original information were significant at the 0.1 level, which is also
true for the parameter estimates of the constant.
Comparing home and away teams with respect to the representativeness heuristic was done to see if
coaches tend to be more or less susceptible to the bias when they are playing in their own stadium.
These results can be seen in Table 7. For home games the parameter estimates for the new and
original information are 0.9534 and 0.1584, respectively. Similarly, for away games the parameter
estimates are 0.9569 for the new information and 0.1494 for the original information, while the es-
timates for the constant were -0.1088 for home teams and -0.0975 for away teams, and the p-values
for all six estimates are less than 0.001, indicating statistical significance. With the parameter esti-
mates being so similar across home teams and away teams, it appears that coaches, as a whole, do
not weight the information differently when they are on the road compared to when they are at home.
Evaluating the individual quarters was done to see if coaches weighted information differently
throughout the course of a game. The results for each quarter are shown in Table 8. For every
quarter the new information has a higher coefficient estimate than the original information, indi-
cating that the representativeness heuristic is present in the coaches’ decision-making processes on
fourth down regardless of when the fourth down is occurring during the game. The estimates of the
weights are closest during the second and third quarters where they are different by approximately
0.53 for both quarters, while the first and fourth quarters see larger differences at 0.81 and 0.90,
respectively.
The results were statistically significant at the 0.05 level for 10 of the 12 parameter estimates, and at
the 0.01 level for eight of the 12 estimates. Original information in the fourth quarter has a p-value
of 0.011, while original information in the first quarter had a p-value of 0.185, which could be due
to the disproportionate amount of times coaches have chosen to kick in the first quarter rather than
attempt to gain a first down, as discussed previously.
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Each of the 32 teams in the NFL were tested separately to examine which teams were overweighting
new information the most, and which were closest to weighting the new and original information
optimally. The results for each team can be seen in Table 9. Though all 32 teams have a higher pa-
rameter estimate for the new information when compared to original information, the New Orleans
Saints are the team with the smallest difference (0.1768) while the New York Jets had a difference
of 1.6266, which is the largest gap out of all the teams. The p-values for the new information were
less than 0.001 for every team, which indicates statistical significance. The original information had
statistical significance at the 0.1 level for 12 parameter estimates. However, 15 had p-values of 0.3
or greater. While this means that those parameter estimates are not statistically significant, it does
indicate that the correlation for those teams could be due to randomness, which could mean they are
not taking the original information into account at all. Another point to support this thought is that
the five teams with the lowest p-values for the original information are five of the most successful
teams during the 12-year span covered in this dataset.
The Pittsburgh Steelers, New York Giants, and New England Patriots are the only teams to win
multiple Super Bowls during the 12 years covered in this dataset, and all three of those teams are in
the top four in terms of smallest difference between the parameter estimates for the new information
and original information. The Saints also won a Super Bowl during this span, as did the Green Bay
Packers (the sixth-best team on the list), meaning that five of the top six teams accounted for nine
of the 12 Super Bowl victories in this timespan, and those are the same five teams mentioned above
for having the lowest p-values for the original information. Conversely, the bottom five teams (the
Jets along with the Arizona Cardinals, Minnesota Vikings, Chicago Bears, and Houston Texans)
only made the playoffs an average of 3.2 times in the specified 12 years, with none of them making
the playoffs more than four times. There are 12 playoff spots per year so on average teams made
the playoffs 4.5 times during this stretch. The top six teams averaged seven playoff appearances.
It important to note that each of the equations presented in this research were conducted several
different times while using different portions of the data as training sets, test sets, and validation
sets. Sometimes different variables were included (or not included), or different transformations
of those variables were used. This was done in an attempt to identify the most accurate models,
capture all of the relevant effects, and as a result, generate the best representation of reality.
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An example of this is shown in Table 10, which presents the results from Equation (9) across differ-
ent variations of the in-game win odds model (Equation (4)). To test the reliability of the in-game
win odds, the 12-year data set was separated into two subsets of six years each; one to build the
model (a training set) and one to predict on (a validation set). This was done using four different
groupings of six years: the first six years (2003-2008), last six years (2009-2014), odd-numbered
years (2003, 2005, 2007, etc.), and even-numbered years (2004, 2006, 2008, etc.). All four variations
yielded similar results in Equation (9), with the parameter estimates ranging from 5.0310 to 5.2605,
the standard errors being either 0.014 or 0.015, and p-values of less than 0.001 for each.
Table 10 also shows the difference between generating the in-game win odds with respect to the
home team compared to generating them with respect to the offensive team. Again, the results from
Equation (9) were quite similar. The standard error was the same for both at 0.014, as was the
p-value (0.000), while the parameter estimates are 5.1316 and 5.1861, when evaluating the home
team and offensive team respectively. These comparisons were made for the inclusion and exclusion
of different variables as well.
With similar results across the board for the different variations of the in-game win odds, the de-
cision of which version to use for the final analysis was made using the logical judgment of which
model variation was believed to be the best reflection of reality and minimized the introduction of
randomness. The choice to use the odd-numbered years for the training set was made to help negate
any underlying effects that could have directly or indirectly impacted the decision-making processes
of coaches over the years, such as rules changes and the improved quality of kickers. For example,
between the 2008 and 2009 seasons there were four new rules implemented to improve player safety
(in addition to new rules regarding the replay system, field obstructions, and other circumstantial
issues), and if any of those rules had an unforeseen or unrecognized impact on the likelihood of a
team winning the game across different game-states, then that information would only be included
in the validation set, but not in the test set, if the data were split into the first and last six years.
Instead, using odd-numbered and even-numbered years eliminates the possibility of an issue of this
nature occurring.
Each of the models developed in this research represented a different portion of information needed
to make it possible to directly test for the representativeness heuristics. Each model returned statis-
tically significant information from large data sets, which enabled the maximization of the validity
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of each component. Trying multiple variations of each model along the way and identifying the best
version for generating the necessary information within each step of the process made it possible to
bring them all together while minimizing the potential variation and error of the overall process.
There are a some specific examples that serve as interesting cases when examining the decisions that
were actually made by coaches in real-game situations. The two that I will discuss are:
• the New Orleans Saints (hosting the Green Bay Packers in 2014)
• the New York Giants (hosting the Indianapolis Colts in 2006)
Both of the teams had to make a fourth-down decision three times in their specified game. The two
examples listed are games in which the coach made the optimal choice for each of those three fourth
down occurrences. These examples are important because they provide a lens through which we can
examine the coaches when they are making optimal decisions on every fourth down they face over
the course of a game.
When the New Orleans Saints played the Green Pay Packers in 2014 they never punted the ball.
Of their three fourth downs, they kicked two field goals and had one first down attempt. The two
field goals were both in the first half of the game while they were trailing by three points and they
tied the game each time. The first down attempt was early in the third quarter when the game was
tied. They were on the Packers’ 43-yard line with two yards to go. They only gained one yard and
therefore failed their first down attempt.
Despite the failed attempt, the Saints went on to win the game. This is an important example
because it illustrates a situation in which the coach, Sean Payton, made the optimal decision, re-
gardless of the attempt being unsuccessful. If a decision does not lead to the desired outcome that
does not mean it was a poor or suboptimal decision. This is why decisions should be evaluated
based on the decision-making process rather than evaluated on the outcome of that decision.
In the second game listed above, the Giants had one first down attempt, one field goal attempt, and
one punt. They faced their first fourth down toward the end of the first quarter when they were
trailing by three points and had the ball at the Colts’ 33-yard line with five yards to go. The optimal
decision was to attempt a first down, which is what their head coach, Tom Coughlin, opted to do.
About midway through the second quarter they were down by six at the Colts’ 22-yard line. The
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optimal choice was to kick a field goal, which is what they did. Lastly, trailing by two points late in
the third quarter they had a fourth down at their own 31-yard line and they chose to punt, which
was again the optimal decision.
Unfortunately, the Giants did not go on to win this game. They failed their first down attempts,
missed their field goal, and after their punt they had turnovers on two of their next three possessions
(a lost fumble and an interception), both of which resulted in the Colts scoring (a touchdown and
a field goal) on their consequential next possessions. This again demonstrates how somebody can
make an optimal decision without having the desired outcome. Even though they had several good
decisions with poor outcomes, the Giants lost this game by just five points.
The obvious difference between these two games is that one resulted in a win while the other resulted
in a loss. However, in games where a team made the optimal decision on more than half of their
fourth downs, they won the game approximately two-thirds of the time (67.2 percent) and even
teams that made the optimal decision between 25 and 50 percent of the time still won more often
than not, winning 51.5 percent of their games. While the examples above used teams that only
faced three fourth down decisions in those games, in this data set one team had 16 fourth downs in
a single game, and on average teams faced more than seven (7.42) fourth downs per game.
Each decision can be extremely important. Improving from making two optimal decisions in a game
to three resulted in the team’s win percentage increase from 38.5 to 48.8 (10.3 percentage points),
and going from three to four saw another large jump to 56.2 percent, which is an increase of 7.4
percentage points. A similar trend is observed when evaluating the percentage of optimal decisions a
team makes in a game, rather than the number of optimal decisions they make in a game. Figure 6
illustrates a team’s win percentage across their percentage of optimal decisions in a game. This
is important because teams will face a varying number of fourth downs from game to game, and
without knowing how many there will be in any given game, they should be striving to make the
optimal decision as frequently as possible.
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6 Discussion
The above results indicate that coaches are yielding to the representativeness heuristic when they
are making fourth down decisions. This information could be useful for the coaches themselves as
well as other high-level decision-makers within the organization. However, beyond just the context
of sport, the methodology used in this research and the approach to directly test for the representa-
tiveness heuristic will be useful to future researchers in the fields of economics, psychology, politics,
human resources and management, among others.
While previous empirical researchers were unable to determine the weight people were applying to
new and prior information when examining real-world scenarios, this study keeps the two components
of representativeness separate by utilizing a Bayesian approach, which in turn, allows us to directly
test for the representativeness heuristic. This methodology introduces a new way for academics to
research the representativeness heuristic without being confined to a laboratory setting (Ashton and
Ashton, 1998; Charness and Levin, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Friedman, 1998; Grether, 1980, 1992).
The results showing that coaches make suboptimal decisions on fourth down by acting too conserva-
tively align with the findings of previous researchers (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1971,
1978; Patel, 2012; Romer, 2002, 2006). Despite the fact that the majority of those researchers used
an expected points model (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1971, 1978; Romer, 2002, 2006)
while only Patel (2012) used a win probability in addition to an expected points model, they all
came to the same conclusion as this research in terms of determining if coaches are making subopti-
mal decisions on fourth down, even though they were unable to determine why coaches are making
suboptimal decisions on fourth down.
It is remarkable that research on this topic has been going on since 1971, striving to statistically
illustrates the idea that coaches in the National Football League are failing to regularly make the
optimal decision on fourth down. It is even more perplexing when considering the fact that Virgil
Carter (one of the authors of that 1971 article) played quarterback in the NFL from 1968 through
1976, meaning he was an active player on an NFL roster at the time his article was published. De-
spite this fact, coaches have continued to make suboptimal decisions on fourth down. Over the next
45 years researchers continued to demonstrate this (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1978;
Patel, 2012; Romer, 2002, 2006) without seeing a noteworthy difference in the coaches’ behaviors.
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This could be due to coaches not being made aware of the research that has been conducted or
not understanding the biases and heuristics that affect the way our brains subconsciously process
information. With this research being able to identify one of the factors impacting the coaches’
decision-making processes, it may enable them to better recognize moments in which this bias is
occurring. Fundamentally, as there continues to be more of a culture shift toward the acceptance
and implementation of statistical analysis within the sport of football, and within the industry of
sport as a whole, it could lead to more coaches having access to this kind of information, and in
turn, lead to them making optimal decisions more often.
As previously mentioned, the results from Equation (1) and the subsequent recommendations for the
optimal decision (shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4) strongly contradict conventional wisdom. It would
therefore be unexpected for a coach to see these findings and begin to make fourth down decisions
based solely on what was shown in this research. However, if the coaches were able to have meet
regularly with an analytics specialist then they could gain a better understanding of the representa-
tiveness heuristic (as well as other subconscious psychological biases) and its role in how our brains
process information. That would, in turn, help those coaches make optimal decisions more often, by
enabling them to be more aware of how representativeness is impacting their decision-making and
to better recognizing when they are in a situation in which this is occurring.
If a franchise in the NFL is willing to not only hire an analytics specialist, but also be committed to
developing an environment conducive to integrating an analytics specialist into their organization’s
overall infrastructure, then that franchise would be best-suited to incorporate this research, and sim-
ilar research, into their day-to-day operations. While this research alone would aid a team’s in-game
decision-making, creating that type of overall culture would also provide scouts with additional tools
for player evaluation; help general managers prepare for the upcoming draft each year, compare the
different ideas they have on roster composition, and assess the coaches themselves; and it would also
assist the coaches when they develop their weekly strategies and gameplans as they prepare for each
opponent throughout the season.
Furthermore, the coaches and the analytics specialist should be able to identify circumstances in
which the coach is comfortable with implementing this research and the resulting recommendations
for the optimal decision on fourth down. They should be able to have constructive conversations to
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gain a better understanding of each person’s perspective on the matter, and thus, be able to find a
middle ground that both parties are comfortable with and then work together to develop an in-game
chart that the coaches would be able to quickly and easily reference when it comes time for them to
actually make those fourth down decisions during a game.
This give-and-take dyadic relationship could and should be implemented across a wide array of
potential topics, opening the door to a productive dialogue leading them to further identify situa-
tions in which the coach would like to have more information that the analytics specialist might be
unaware of, as well as identifying the statistical tools and capabilities that the analytics specialist
possesses that the coach might be unaware of. Creating an environment of this nature would allow
the coaches and analytics specialist to develop a rapport and a level of trust that would help maxi-
mize the potential of implementing analytics into a NFL organization.
This research aligns with and reinforces the existing theory and the findings of previous researchers
who studied the impact of the representativeness heuristic on people’s decision-making processes.
The results from the hypothesis test (Equation (8)) show that coaches are underweighting the prior
information (Grether, 1980, 1992), and that they are not efficiently incorporating the new informa-
tion (Charness and Levin, 2005; Friedman, 1998) when making these fourth down decisions.
Within the broader context of Prospect Theory, this research shows how challenging it would be for
someone to quickly estimate these kinds of values with acceptable accuracy. This further illustrates
one of the underlying concepts of Prospect Theory, which is the idea that bias is a byproduct of the
fact that it is too difficult and computationally intensive for people to always attempt to maximize
utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974).
Utilizing a Bayesian approach for not only the decision model, but for the win probability model
as well, could help answer other questions or complications that have come up in previous research.
Bayes’ rule includes a prior likelihood, which in this case allows us to account for team quality when
estimating in-game win probabilities. Including a prior also helps regulate any extreme estimations
due to limited data within specific situations. Being able to account for this situational data at all
while analyzing decision-making is another benefit of a Bayesian approach.
Previous researchers (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1971, 1978; Patel, 2012; Romer, 2002,
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2006) avoided accounting for such information in their expected points models by examining only
plays that took place in a certain quarter of the game, within a certain score margin, or between
certain yard lines, and none of them accounted for team quality. Future researchers would be able
to include more in-game situations (and thus, more data) in their analyses by using a Bayesian
approach, whether it be to develop a win probability model, an expected points model, or another
means by which to quantify the value of a given decision or situation.
Beyond NFL coaches’ decision-making, this research and its results are potentially generalizable to
the influence of the representativeness heuristic on peoples’ decision-making under uncertainty. NFL
coaches are highly qualified personnel and among the best in their field. Coaches and their decisions
are highly scrutinized.
The accuracy of the coaches’ decisions is critiqued by the fans, the media, the players, and even
other coaches. Franchises in the NFL regularly dismiss head coaches who are failing to meet the
expectations that the organization is holding them to. If other NFL teams consider those coaches
to still be capable of living up to their standards then one of those teams might choose to hire him.
Otherwise, that coach is left to retire or seek employment elsewhere that would be of a lesser role,
at a lower level of competition, or within a different sector of the industry entirely.
Conversely, the teams that are looking to replace their coach will look to hire someone who has
been impressive in a lesser role, successful at a lower level of competition, or has proven themselves
a worthy candidate as the head coach for another team in the NFL. Overall, this process leads to
an efficient system for ensuring that the 32 head coaches in the NFL are among the best football
coaches in the world.
This research aimed to analyze the decisions made by NFL coaches and the decision-making pro-
cesses that led them to make those choices. This means that the immediate outcome of a play was
not included in the analysis, but only the eventual outcome of the game. This study examined how
the decision itself would impact a team’s probability of winning rather than how the outcome of a
play would impact the team’s probability of winning. This is in contrast to the other researchers
(Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1971, 1978; Patel, 2012; Romer, 2002, 2006), who made
assumptions about the situation a team would be in, given that a play was successful or unsuccess-
ful, and then, based on those assumed situations, estimated the costs and benefits for each of the
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potential decisions.
Therefore, it is somewhat unexpected (but encouraging) that the findings from this research and
the resulting estimations for when the option to attempt a first down becomes the optimal decision
would so closely reflect theirs. It is important to note that, despite the numerous differences in our
methodologies, our results are still similar. It tells us that no matter how one dissects the question,
coaches are making suboptimal decisions, and no matter the methodology for determining what the
optimal decision is, the resulting recommendations are similar.
However, where the other researchers (Carroll et al., 1989; Carter and Machol, 1971, 1978; Patel,
2012; Romer, 2002, 2006) had to make inferences based on the contexts of their findings, this analysis
directly tests for a specific subconscious psychological bias. Due to their methodologies, the other
researchers were unable to determine why the actual decisions being made by coaches did not re-
flect those of the aforementioned recommendations, and therefore their results were open to criticism.
Alternatively, previous researchers examining the representativeness heuristic (Ashton and Ashton
1998; Charness and Levin, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Friedman, 1998; Grether, 1980, 1992) con-
ducted laboratory experiments to directly test for the presence of a bias (or biases) in their subjects’
decision-making processes. Though previous researchers had to pick between studying a real-world
scenario and being able to directly test for a subconscious psychological bias, this research utilized
observational data from a real-world scenario while retaining the ability to directly test for the rep-
resentativeness heuristic.
7 Concluding Remarks
Limitations for this study include the idea that when teams choose to attempt a first down on fourth
down they are already in a situation where they are likely to lose the game regardless of whether the
decision being made is the optimal choice or not. This could potentially be addressed with future
research that would use a Bayesian approach to create an expected points model rather than a win
probability model.
Additionally, it may have been better to use a Bayesian regression for the conditional likelihood
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components rather than multinomial logistic regressions. This is also something that could be taken
into account for future research. It could also be beneficial to look at specific coaches or coaching
characteristics such as age and experience, rather than pooling all of the coaches together and ana-
lyzing them as one group.
Another area for future research could address other potential factors that might impact a coach’s
decision-making process, such as social pressures, in-game injuries, season-level objective functions,
and coach-quarterback interaction. These ideas could lend themselves to future research such as
case studies, examinations of the principal-agent concept, and several other possibilities.
Future research could also include testing for the presence of additional heuristics and psychological
biases in the coaches’ decision-making processes beyond the representativeness heuristic alone. This
research has motivated another project to test for loss aversion, which is currently being worked on.
This research utilized an innovative way to directly test for the representativeness heuristic in real-
world decision-making. The methodology used for this paper could impact not only sport analytics,
but a variety of other fields as well, including economics, psychology, politics, human resources, and
management among others.
While the method and results from this research will be of interest to sport managers and analytic
practitioners, the primary contribution is in the discernment of optimal decision-making relating to
outcomes. It is certain that sport psychology will be interested in the theory, method, and results;
as will organizational theorists concerned with investigating decisions within the greater context of
organizations. This research also helps to further demonstrate that in-game sport contest informa-
tion is a fruitful area for academics to examine and test hypotheses.
The results of this research are potentially generalizable beyond NFL coaches’ decision-making pro-
cesses. This is, in part, because these findings coincide with the claims of the previous researchers
who examined the influence of the representative heuristic on how people process information and
the decisions that they make under uncertainty. Additionally, this provides further support against
the criticisms of those previous researchers’ conclusions.
Within the context of this paper, there are implications for the decision-making processes of coaches,
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who could be more conscientious about how they are allowing different information to impact the
choices they make. Simply being made aware of the existence of the representativeness heuristic and
other psychological biases could help coaches make optimal decisions more often.
Beyond the coaches themselves, this research would be beneficial to general managers and other
high-level decision-makers within NFL front offices, who could use this information to aid in their
evaluations of coaches. This could be utilized when determining whether or not to retain the team’s
current head coach and when choosing between a pool of candidates to hire as a new head coach.
Additionally, the Bayesian approach used for this research will be useful to future academics who
wish to directly test for the representativeness heuristic. The hope is that the methodology utilized
for this research will further progress the research that is being done not only within the field of
sport analytics, but within the realm of sport management as a whole.
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8 Graphs and Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics of the game-state information across the three options
a team has on fourth down: first down attempts, field goal attempts, and punts.
Game-state component Summary data
n Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
First Down Attempt
Minutes remaining 5790 18.0888 17.5321 0.0170 59.7330
Absolute yard line 5790 35.9477 21.7339 1.0000 99.0000
In game win prob 5790 0.3416 0.3306 0.0004 0.9996
Score margin 5790 -6.5568 13.1643 -59.0000 59.0000
Pre-game win prob 5790 0.4680 0.2022 0.0207 0.9793
Point Total 5790 42.7721 4.7605 30.0000 60.0000
Defense Timeouts 5790 2.3775 0.8601 0.0000 3.0000
Offense Timeouts 5790 2.1385 1.0000 0.0000 3.0000
Yards to go 5790 4.7230 4.9080 1.0000 35.0000
Home Indicator 5790 0.4769 0.4995 0.0000 1.0000
Field Goal Attempts
Minutes remaining 10583 28.9001 16.3236 0.0000 59.1170
Absolute yard line 10583 18.2816 9.9141 1.0000 46.0000
In game win prob 10583 0.5440 0.2945 0.0005 0.9993
Score margin 10583 0.7259 9.4222 -45.0000 48.0000
Pre-game win prob 10583 0.5109 0.2000 0.0207 0.9724
Point Total 10583 42.8035 4.7670 30.0000 60.0000
Defense Timeouts 10583 2.5449 0.7859 0.0000 3.0000
Offense Timeouts 10583 2.4372 0.8265 0.0000 3.0000
Yards to go 10583 6.8757 4.6140 1.0000 34.0000
Home Indicator 10583 0.5134 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000
Punts
Minutes remaining 29186 30.5721 16.9582 0.0500 59.9000
Absolute yard line 29186 64.8480 14.8729 27.0000 99.0000
In game win prob 29186 0.5051 0.3071 0.0006 0.9997
Score margin 29186 -0.3925 10.5610 -59.0000 59.0000
Pre-game win prob 29186 0.4856 0.2020 0.0207 0.9793
Point Total 29186 42.4049 4.7405 30.0000 60.0000
Defense Timeouts 29186 2.5961 0.7516 0.0000 3.0000
Offense Timeouts 29186 2.6494 0.6484 0.0000 3.0000
Yards to go 29186 8.5331 5.9038 1.0000 48.0000
Home Indicator 29186 0.4857 0.4998 0.0000 1.0000
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Table 2. Summary statistics for pre-game win probabilities based on game outcomes, presenting
the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum across wins, losses and ties.
Outcome n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Win 1760 0.6356 0.1695 0.1121 0.9793
Loss 1308 0.4891 0.1825 0.0613 0.8979
Tie 4 0.6234 0.2876 0.2078 0.8677
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Table 3. Summary statistics of the game-state data used to estimate the conditional likelihood
across wins, losses and ties, with respect to the home team when they are on offense.
Component Outcome Summary data
n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Offense
Down Loss 73017 2.0203 1.0191 1.000 4.000
Tie 244 1.9303 1.0099 1.000 4.000
Win 104715 1.9776 0.9955 1.000 4.000
Absolute yard line Loss 73017 53.4923 23.7054 1.000 99.000
Tie 244 51.8689 22.7167 1.000 92.000
Win 104715 48.9775 24.6831 1.000 99.000
Minutes remaining Loss 73017 28.6493 17.5820 0.000 60.000
Tie 244 29.3236 17.6829 0.033 59.917
Win 104715 29.5292 17.2416 0.000 60.000
Point Total Loss 73014 42.7897 4.7989 31.000 57.000
Tie 244 42.0820 2.5112 38.000 44.500
Win 104711 42.8366 4.7809 30.000 60.000
Defense Timeouts Loss 73017 2.5811 0.7040 0.000 3.000
Tie 244 2.7295 0.5598 0.000 3.000
Win 104715 2.5824 0.7390 0.000 3.000
Offense Timeouts Loss 73017 2.5689 0.7826 0.000 3.000
Tie 244 2.6926 0.7697 0.000 3.000
Win 104715 2.6175 0.6882 0.000 3.000
Yards to go Loss 73017 8.6102 4.0640 1.000 43.000
Tie 244 8.7664 3.5623 1.000 23.000
Win 104715 8.3077 3.9246 1.000 46.000
Score margin Loss 73017 -6.4405 8.8818 -46.000 24.000
Tie 244 -2.8648 6.0029 -16.000 7.000
Win 104715 5.3618 9.2666 -24.000 59.000
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Table 4. Summary statistics of the game-state data used to estimate the conditional likelihood
across wins, losses and ties, with respect to the home team when they are on defense.
Component Outcome Summary data
n Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Defense
Down Loss 69218 2.0168 1.0045 1.000 4.00
Tie 237 2.0253 1.0165 1.000 4.00
Win 93629 2.0558 1.0226 1.000 4.00
Absolute yard line Loss 69218 50.6768 24.0794 1.000 99.00
Tie 237 48.6920 23.9215 2.000 99.00
Win 93629 46.5516 23.1833 1.000 99.00
Minutes remaining Loss 69218 29.2596 17.2849 0.017 60.00
Tie 237 27.1716 17.6969 0.100 59.25
Win 93629 28.7268 17.5063 0.017 60.00
Point Total Loss 69218 42.8003 4.8311 31.000 57.00
Tie 237 41.9177 2.5505 38.000 44.50
Win 93629 42.8526 4.7845 30.000 60.00
Defense Timeouts Loss 69218 2.6176 0.7217 0.000 3.00
Tie 237 2.6920 0.6843 0.000 3.00
Win 93629 2.6317 0.6640 0.000 3.00
Offense Timeouts Loss 69218 2.5711 0.7231 0.000 3.00
Tie 237 2.6287 0.7287 0.000 3.00
Win 93629 2.5390 0.7896 0.000 3.00
Yards to go Loss 69218 8.2970 3.9963 1.000 41.00
Tie 237 8.2321 3.8993 1.000 23.00
Win 93629 8.5866 4.1736 1.000 48.00
Score margin Loss 69218 -3.9189 8.7525 -46.000 25.00
Tie 237 -0.4219 5.1765 -13.000 10.00
Win 93629 7.8970 9.4279 -24.000 59.00
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Table 5. Results of the multinomial logistic regression shown in Equation (5), which
represents the conditional likelihood component of Equation (1), the decision model.
Component Decision Regression Results
Coefficient S.E. P-value
Wins (n=10901)
Constant Field Goal 6.3035 0.339 0.000
Punt -11.5021 0.433 0.000
Minutes Remaining Field Goal 1.1337 0.092 0.000
Punt 1.4898 0.085 0.000
Score margin Field Goal 0.0018 0.006 0.754
Punt 0.0147 0.005 0.005
Absolute yard line Field Goal -2.0734 0.084 0.000
Punt 3.4359 0.103 0.000
Yards to go Field Goal 2.2989 0.069 0.000
Punt 1.5007 0.055 0.000
Home indicator Field Goal -0.7343 0.106 0.000
Punt -0.2126 0.094 0.024
Offense Timeouts Field Goal -0.5792 0.079 0.000
Punt -0.3150 0.075 0.000
Defense Timeouts Field Goal -0.7277 0.086 0.000
Punt -1.1389 0.080 0.000
Offense Point Total Field Goal -0.0926 0.016 0.000
Punt -0.1479 0.014 0.000
Defense Point Total Field Goal -0.0334 0.018 0.062
Punt -0.0397 0.015 0.010
Losses (n=12087)
Constant Field Goal 4.8133 0.314 0.000
Punt -14.9857 0.439 0.000
Minutes Remaining Field Goal 2.9334 0.114 0.000
Punt 2.3252 0.090 0.000
Score margin Field Goal 0.1633 0.006 0.000
Punt 0.1159 0.005 0.000
Absolute yard line Field Goal -2.0620 0.075 0.000
Punt 3.4623 0.095 0.000
Yards to go Field Goal 1.3213 0.057 0.000
Punt 0.8614 0.043 0.000
Home indicator Field Goal -0.8468 0.096 0.000
Punt -0.2138 0.079 0.007
Offense Timeouts Field Goal -0.2372 0.062 0.000
Punt 0.3221 0.055 0.000
Defense Timeouts Field Goal -1.1550 0.078 0.000
Punt -0.9966 0.069 0.000
Offense Point Total Field Goal -0.2879 0.019 0.000
Punt -0.2017 0.015 0.000
Defense Point Total Field Goal -0.0603 0.016 0.000
Punt -0.0206 0.014 0.140
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Table 6. Results of the hypothesis test shown in Equation (8), separated by year to demonstrate
the variation of the weight being applied to new and original information over time.
Year Information Regression Results
Coefficient S.E. P-value
2004 Constant -0.1230 0.043 0.004
New Information 0.9817 0.040 0.000
Original Information 0.1164 0.068 0.089
2006 Constant -0.0683 0.041 0.096
New Information 0.8527 0.037 0.000
Original Information 0.1588 0.065 0.015
2008 Constant -0.1234 0.044 0.005
New Information 1.0601 0.044 0.000
Original Information 0.0527 0.073 0.470
2010 Constant -0.0645 0.043 0.131
New Information 0.9552 0.040 0.000
Original Information 0.2867 0.067 0.000
2012 Constant -0.1339 0.042 0.002
New Information 0.9240 0.038 0.000
Original Information 0.1633 0.067 0.014
2014 Constant -0.1069 0.045 0.017
New Information 0.9795 0.039 0.000
Original Information 0.1428 0.065 0.028
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Table 7. Results of the hypothesis test shown in Equation (8), separated by home and away
teams, demonstrating the variation of the weight being applied to new and original information.
Team 1lInformation Regression Results
Coefficient S.E. P-value
Home Constant -0.1088 0.026 0.000
New Information 0.9534 0.023 0.000
Original Information 0.1584 0.038 0.000
Away Constant -0.0975 0.024 0.000
New Information 0.9569 0.023 0.000
Original Information 0.1494 0.039 0.000
41
Table 8. Results of the hypothesis test shown in Equation (8), separated by quarter,
demonstrating the variation of the weight being applied to new and original information.
Information n Regression Results
Coefficient S.E. t-value P-value
First Quarter
Constant 5017 -0.1097 0.038 -2.882 0.004
New Information 5017 0.9250 0.043 21.291 0.000
Original Information 5017 0.1194 0.090 1.326 0.185
Second Quarter
Constant 6195 -0.0710 0.030 -2.350 0.019
New Information 6195 0.8348 0.035 23.653 0.000
Original Information 6195 0.3077 0.066 4.690 0.000
Third Quarter
Constant 5031 -0.1440 0.041 -3.529 0.000
New Information 5031 0.8601 0.042 20.703 0.000
Original Information 5031 0.3277 0.095 3.454 0.001
Fourth Quarter
Constant 6358 -0.0638 0.070 -0.906 0.365
New Information 6358 1.0585 0.030 34.879 0.000
Original Information 6358 0.1623 0.064 2.533 0.011
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Table 9. Results of the hypothesis test shown in Equation (8), separated by team, to show
the variation of the weights being applied to the information from team to team.
Regression Results
New Information Original Information
Team Coefficient S.E. P-value Coefficient S.E. P-value
Arizona Cardinals 1.2444 0.102 0.000 -0.2529 0.155 0.103
Atlanta Falcons 1.3013 0.120 0.000 0.3579 0.164 0.029
Baltimore Ravens 0.9779 0.092 0.000 0.0944 0.158 0.550
Buffalo Bills 1.0635 0.098 0.000 0.1337 0.161 0.406
Carolina Panthers 0.9989 0.095 0.000 -0.0310 0.161 0.848
Chicago Bears 1.2303 0.113 0.000 -0.1413 0.168 0.401
Cincinnati Bengals 0.9615 0.089 0.000 0.3682 0.153 0.016
Cleveland Browns 0.8403 0.087 0.000 0.1709 0.152 0.259
Dallas Cowboys 0.7633 0.090 0.000 0.2874 0.151 0.056
Denver Broncos 0.9366 0.092 0.000 0.3907 0.163 0.017
Detroit Lions 0.8563 0.090 0.000 0.3358 0.160 0.036
Green Bay Packers 0.8955 0.090 0.000 0.3896 0.160 0.015
Houston Texans 1.2052 0.108 0.000 -0.0031 0.173 0.986
Indianapolis Colts 0.9371 0.106 0.000 -0.2202 0.203 0.277
Jacksonville Jaguars 0.9313 0.091 0.000 -0.0765 0.146 0.600
Kansas City Chiefs 0.9695 0.092 0.000 -0.0400 0.163 0.806
Miami Dolphins 0.9764 0.091 0.000 0.3169 0.155 0.041
Minnesota Vikings 1.4130 0.124 0.000 -0.0517 0.173 0.765
New England Patriots 0.9962 0.114 0.000 0.6833 0.186 0.000
New Orleans Saints 0.7357 0.084 0.000 0.5589 0.152 0.000
New York Giants 0.7079 0.079 0.000 0.4467 0.151 0.003
New York Jets 1.5622 0.139 0.000 -0.0644 0.183 0.725
Oakland Raiders 1.0265 0.102 0.000 0.2938 0.169 0.082
Philadelphia Eagles 0.8970 0.089 0.000 0.2301 0.161 0.152
Pittsburgh Steelers 0.6700 0.086 0.000 0.4391 0.155 0.005
San Diego Chargers 0.8672 0.092 0.000 0.1418 0.148 0.337
Seattle Seahawks 0.8145 0.079 0.000 0.1453 0.142 0.308
San Francisco 49ers 0.7415 0.073 0.000 0.0262 0.139 0.850
St. Louis Rams 0.8345 0.083 0.000 0.0314 0.152 0.837
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 0.9903 0.098 0.000 0.0156 0.155 0.920
Tennessee Titans 0.7742 0.078 0.000 0.1206 0.142 0.395
Washington Redskins 0.6966 0.077 0.000 0.1481 0.136 0.277
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Table 10. Results of the logistic regression shown in Equation (9) for different
specification of the in-game win odds model.
Variation Regression Results
Coefficient S.E. P-value
Years in Training Set
First six years 5.0310 0.014 0.000
Last six years 5.2605 0.015 0.000
Odd years 5.1316 0.014 0.000
Even years 5.1639 0.014 0.000
Team Evaluated in Training Set
Home team 5.1861 0.014 0.000
Offensive team 5.1316 0.014 0.000
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